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Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games:
a Multi-Retailer Inventory Application
D. Bauso, L. Giarŕe, and R. Pesenti
Abstract
We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative
dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of the above solutions
by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize
the above solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social
optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm
that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns
a sequence of joint decisions, each one obtained from the previous one by an unilateral improvement
on the part of a single player. We also specialize the game to a multi-retailer inventory system.
Keywords: Game Theory, Inventory, Consensus Protocols, Dynamic Programming.
I. I NTRODUCTION
We consider a finite horizon noncooperative game [2] where the stage cost of theith player
associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players
making the same decision. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the
game. In Section III, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria and of at least one Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium. We do this by recasting the game within the framework of potential
games [15] which always admit at least one Nash equilibrium, although, its computation is a
non trivial issue [7], [10], [17], [18]. In Section IV and V, we show that stronger results are
obtained if the horizon reduces to a single stage. We find all Nash equilibria and in particular a
D. Bauso is with DINFO, Università di Palermo, 90128 Palermo, Italy, E-Mail: dario.bauso@unipa.it
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Pareto optimal one that is social optimal in the set of all Nash equilibria, as it minimizes the sum
of the players’ costs. We also define a consensus protocol [3], [12], [13], [14] that makes the
players converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. We do this in agreement with a large
body of literature on evolutionary game theory and fictitious play (see e.g., the book [5] and
[16]) that centers around the convergence to refined Nash equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria that
meet special properties. Social and Pareto optimality are just properties characterizing the Nash
equilibria to which the dynamics induced by the consensus protocols converges. In Section VI, we
come back to the multi-stage game and we modify the above protocol to derive a so called best
response path algorithm that makes the players converge to a Nash equilibrium. This algorithm
is based on the property of potential games establishing that any best response path converges
to a Nash equilibrium [15], [16]. A best response path is a sequence of joint decisions, each one
obtained from the previous one by an unilateral improvement on the part of a single player. In
Section VII, we specialize the game to a multi-inventory application [1], [6], [8], [9], [11].
II. N ONCOOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME
We deal with a discrete time finite horizon noncooperative game which presents all the
ingredients typical of an inventory application. However, we deal with the game in its general
form in order to emphasize what characteristics make the results of this paper hold.
Consider a set ofn playersΓ = {1, . . . , n} and letN be the horizon length. For eachi ∈ Γ
and each stagek = 0, . . . , N , let xki ∈ X
k





be a decision. Here, we have denoted byXki andU
k
i the set of feasible states and decisions at
stagek and byZ, N the set of integers and non negative integers (zero included), respectively.
Let uk−i = {u
k
j}j∈Γ,j 6=i be the vector of the decisions of playersj 6= i at stagek. Also, define
uk = {uki }i∈Γ, ui = {u
0
i , . . . , u
N
i } and u−i = {u
0
−i, . . . , u
N
−i}. Let the following finite horizon
















i ), k = 0, . . . , N − 1, (2)






k)) and equation (2) is the state dynamics withΞ(., .) being a generic nonlinear
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i ) = +∞,











k)) = δ(uki )ψ(a(u
k)) + γ(xki , u
k
i ), (3)
where: functionδ(uki ) is equal to one ifu
k
i > 0 (we say that theith player isactive), and zero





functionψ(a(uk)) is positive and strictly decreasing ona(.); function γ(xki , u
k
i ) is coercive, non
negative and independent ofa(.). Henceforth, for the short of notation, we writeak to mean
a(uk). Also we denote byu = [u1, . . . ,un] a generic solution of the game (in the following we
also use the notation[ui,u−i] to meanu). Finally, we defineJi(x0i ,u−i) = minui Ĵi(x
0
i ,ui,u−i).
III. N ASH AND PARETO OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria, and characterize the Pareto optimal
ones. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria by exploiting the well-known result in [15]
asserting that a noncooperative game always admits a pure Nash Equilibrium if apotential
function exists. A potential function is a functionΦ(x0,u) such that, if û = [ûi, û−i] is a
solution obtained from an unilateral deviation fromu on the part of a generic playeri (hence
ui 6= ûi, butu−i = û−i), the difference induced to the potential function∆Φ = Φ(x0, [ûi, û−i])−
Φ(x0, [ui,u−i]) is equal to, or at least proportional to, the difference in the cost for playeri, that
is, ∆Ĵi = Ĵi(x0i , ûi, û−i) − Ĵi(x
0
i ,ui,u−i).
Theorem 1:Game (1)-(2) is a potential game.














function for game (1)-(2). To this end, let a solution[ui,u−i] be given and consider a second
solution[ûi, û−i] obtained from an unilateral deviation on the part of a generic playeri. Our aim




v, . . . , x̂
N
v be the sequence
of states obtained from (2) under decisions[ui,u−i] and [ûi, û−i] respectively. Then it holds
∆Ĵi = Ĵi(x
0







k)) + γ(x̂ki , û
k
i ) − δ(u
k
i )ψ(a(u
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v) = 0 (4)
δ(ûki )ψ(a(û










Condition (4) holds as the decisions and the states as well of any playerv 6= i are unchanged;






v . To prove that condition (5) holds, observe that it must hold
a(ûk) = a(uk) ± 1. Actually, if only player i may change decision then the number of active
players either reduces by 1 (playeri changes from being active to being non active) or increases
by 1 (playeri changes from being non active to being active). Consider, for instance, the latter
case, we haveδ(ûki )ψ(a(û
k)) − δ(uki )ψ(a(u





j=1 ψ(j) = ψ(a(û
k)). We can conclude that rhs and lhs of
(5) are equal. Symmetrical argument apply to the case where playeri changes from being active
to being not active. In this situation, both sides of (5) are equal to−ψ(a(uk)).
As a consequence, by the results in [15], we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Game (1)-(2) admits at least one Nash equilibrium.






i , . . . , u
N∗
i }
and u∗−i = {u
0∗
−i, . . . , u
N∗
−i }. In particular, we consider theith player and study the unilateral
improvements by fixing the decisions of all other players over the horizonu∗−i. We denote by
a




j ) + δ(u
k̂
i ) for k̂ = k, . . . , N . The vectora
k∗
collects the number of active players from stagek to N as a function of{uki , . . . , u
N
i } and for
fixed {uk∗−i, . . . , u
N∗




























0∗). In solving (6)-(7), we can do as ifak∗ was independent
of uki . Actually, we can substitutea




j ) + 1, for k = 0, . . . , N . We








k). To see why the
latter equality holds true, observe that the stage costgi(xki , u
k
i , a
k∗) depends onak∗ only through
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the term,δ(uki )ψ(a
k∗), which is different from zero only whenδ(uki ) = 1, that is whena
k∗ =
ak∗ − δ(uki ) + 1 = ã
k. It follows that the best response for playeri must be a solution of
equation (7), i.e.,






k∗) + γ(xki , u
k












k) + γ(xki , u
k






where we definẽak = {ãk, . . . , ãN} for k = 0, . . . , N . The above equation may present multiple
solutions. However, the values assumed byuk∗i depends on the other player decisions only in
terms of the number of active players. With this in mind, we can derive that given two equilibria
û and ũ, if δ(ûki ) = δ(ũ
k
i ) for all i ∈ Γ and for all k = 0, . . . , N − 1, then the two equilibria
are equivalent, that iŝJi(x0i , ûi, û−i) = Ĵi(x
0
i , ũi, ũ−i) for all i ∈ Γ. In the following, in case of
multiple solutions, we chooseuk∗i as the lowest among the possible scalar values that satisfy (8).
In this way we guarantee the uniqueness of the best response and we can describe the equilibria
indifferently in term of eitheru∗ or a0 given their bijective correspondence. Needless to say that
the players can choose any other criterium that guarantees the uniqueness of the best response
in (8) without compromising the validity of the results.
Let us observe that the payoff̂Ji(x0i ,ui,u−i) of player i is independent ofu−i if the player
is never active, i.e.,uki = 0 for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Denote such a payoff value aŝJi(x
0
i ,0, .).




i ,0, .). Also,
the finiteness of the horizon, the behavior ofγ(., .) andΞ(., .) imply that Ĵi(x0i ,ui,u−i) → ∞
if, for some k = 0, . . . , N − 1, |uki | → ∞. Then, for each playeri ∈ Γ, there exists a finite
valueB(x0i ) ≥ 0, function of the initial statex
0
i , such that in any equilibrium pointu
∗ we have
|uk∗i | ≤ B(x
0






i ,0, .). As
for any Nash equilibrium each component is an integer value satisfying0 ≤ uk∗i ≤ B(x
0
i ) for
all k = 0, . . . N , then Nash equilibria are finite in number. The next theorem follows.
Theorem 2:At least a Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Proof: As the Nash equilibria are finite in number, there must necessarily exist a Nash
equilibrium that is not dominated.
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IV. SINGLE STAGE GAME
We now consider a finite horizon noncooperative game consisting in a single stage game with
payoffs (in all the equations of this subsection we drop the dependence onk)
Ĵi(xi, ui, u−i) = δ(ui)ψ(a(u)) + γ(xi, ui), (9)
where all the variables and functions have the same definitions and properties of the original
game. Game (9) is trivially obtained from the original game by imposingN = 0.
For eachi ∈ Γ, let l : Z → N, increasing function ofxi, be given. Henceforth, we simply use
the notationli to meanl(xi), i.e., the value of the function for fixedxi. Note that in the single
stage game and once fixed the scenario (xi fixed), xi becomes a known parameter (the initial
inventory) and therefore we can omit dependence ofl(xi) on xi.
Definition 1: A threshold strategyis any functionũ(.) : N × N −→ R such thatũ(a, li)
assumes a positive value ifa ≥ li and is null otherwise. In this caseli is saidthreshold.
The above threshold strategy says that playeri is active only if the number of active playersa
is greater than or equal to thresholdli. Let us now characterize a Nash equilibrium,u∗ =
[u∗1, . . . , u
∗
n], for the single stage game, whereu
∗





j) + δ(ui) the vector collecting the number of active players as a function
of ui and for fixedu∗−i. Condition (8) becomes
u∗i = arg min
ui∈Ui
[δ(ui)ψ(a
∗) + γ(xi, ui)], (10)
and in case of multiple solutions we chooseu∗i as the lowest among the possible scalar values





and use the same trick explained for the solution of (6)-(7).
Lemma 1:At a Nash equilibriumu∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u
∗
n], the best responseu
∗
i of each playeri is
a threshold strategyu∗i = ũ(a
∗, li) with threshold
li = min{µ ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ψ(µ) < γ(xi, 0)}. (11)
Proof: Let us first prove that the best responseu∗i of player i is a threshold strategy. On
this purpose, for each playeri, and for any number of active playersβ ≥ α, let ζα andζβ be the
best responses fora∗ = α anda∗ = β respectively (they solve (10) witha∗ = α anda∗ = β).
We show that ifζα > 0 (it meansδ(ζα) = 1, the ith player is active) thenζβ > 0. To see this
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observe thatζα > 0 only if
ψ(α) + γ(xi, ζα) ≤ γ(xi, 0).
As ψ(.) is a positive function, to haveζβ > 0 it suffices to prove that
ψ(β) + γ(xi, ζβ) ≤ γ(xi, 0).
Note that the rhs of the above two inequalities are equal as they do not depend on the number
of active players. Then we can show that the latter inequality holds as
ψ(β) + γ(xi, ζβ) ≤ ψ(β) + γ(xi, ζα) ≤ ψ(α) + γ(xi, ζα) ≤ γ(x
k
i , 0), (12)
where the first inequality is due to the optimality ofζβ and the second inequality is due to the
monotonicity ofψ on the number of active players. Then, we have proved thatu∗i = ũ(a
∗, li).
Now, to see that the threshold is as in (11) observe that it must also holdψ(α) + γ(xi, u∗i ) <
γ(xi, 0) for all α ≥ li andψ(α) + γ(xi, u∗i ) ≥ γ(xi, 0) for all α < li. But the latter conditions
hold if and only if the value ofli is as in (11).
As in (7), the best responseu∗i defined in the above lemma depends on other players course
of action u∗−i only througha
∗. In the next theorem we characterize the unique Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium. To this aim, let us relate Nash equilibria to subsets of players as follows.
Without loss of generality, assume that the players are indexed increasingly on their thresholds,
i.e., l1 ≤ l2 ≤ . . . ≤ ln. Define compatible setany set of consecutive playersC = {1, . . . , r}
such thatlr ≤ r. Any player of a compatible setC benefits from being active if all the other
players inC are active. Observe that for any Nash equilibrium∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u
∗
n] there exists a
compatible setC such thatδ(u∗i ) = 1 if and only if i ∈ C. Indeed, let̂i = max{i : δ(u
∗
i ) = 1},
thenδ(u∗i ) = 1 for all i ∈ Γ such thati < î sinceli ≤ l̂i. Now, consider themaximal compatible
setC = {1, . . . , λ̄} where
λ̄ = arg max
λ
{λ ∈ {1, . . . , n} : lλ ≤ λ} .
Note thatC may be empty and that, by maximality ofC, li > λ̄ + 1 for all playersi 6∈ C.




i ) = 1 if
and only if i ∈ C
Proof: The solutionu∗ describes the case where the active players are the only players in
C and therefore the number of active players isλ̄. Then, no playersi ∈ C benefit by unilaterally
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deciding of becoming non active asli ≤ λ̄ and also no playersj 6∈ C benefit by deciding of
becoming active aslj > λ̄ + 1.





1 if i ∈ C
0 otherwise
.
If ψ(λ̄) + γ(xi, u∗i ) 6= γ(xi, 0) for all i ∈ C, then
• Pareto optimality.The Nash equilibriumu∗ is Pareto optimal;
• Uniqueness.The Nash equilibriumu∗ is the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
• Social optimality. The Nash equilibriumu∗ is social optimal in the set of all Nash equilibria.
Proof: Pareto optimality. We show that the Nash equilibriumu∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u
∗
n] is Pareto
optimal since any other vector of strategiesu = [u1, . . . , un] induces a worse payoff for at least
one player. In the Nash equilibriumu∗, eachi ∈ C gets a payoffĴi(xi, u∗i , u
∗
−i) = ψ(λ̄) +
γ(xi, u
∗
i ) < γ(xi, 0), eachi 6∈ C gets a payoffĴi(xi, 0, u
∗
−i) = γ(xi, 0) < ψ(λ̄ + 1) + γ(xi, ui)
for all ui > 0. Now, consider the vector of strategiesu. DefineD = {i ∈ C : δ(ui) = 0} as the
set of players withli ≤ λ̄ that are not active inu and E = {i 6∈ C : δ(ui) = 1} as the set of
players withli > λ̄ + 1 that are active inu. Let us denote byν andη the cardinality ofD and
E respectively. Trivially,D ∪ E 6= ∅ asu 6= u∗. We deal withE 6= ∅ andE = ∅ separately.
If E 6= ∅ andD = ∅, each playeri ∈ E gets a payoffĴi(xi, ui, u−i) = ψ(λ̄ + η) + γ(xi, ui)
strictly greater thanĴi(xi, 0, u∗−i) = γ(xi, 0) as C is the maximal compatible set. The latter
condition trivially holds also whenD 6= ∅ since, in this case, each playeri ∈ E incurs in a
higher payoffĴi(xi, ui, u−i) = ψ(λ̄ + η − ν) + γ(xi, ui).
If E = ∅, thenD 6= ∅, and each playeri ∈ C \ D, if exists, gets a payoff̂Ji(xi, ui, u−i) =




−i) = ψ(λ̄) + γ(xi, u
∗
i ). At the same time, each playeri ∈ D
gets a payoffĴi(xi, 0, u−i) = γ(xi, 0) > Ĵi(xi, u∗i , u
∗
−i) = ψ(λ̄)+γ(xi, u
∗
i ). Finally, eachi ∈ Γ\C
gets a payoffĴi(xi, 0, u−i) = γ(xi, 0) = Ĵi(xi, 0, u∗−i).
Uniqueness and social optimality. We prove the uniqueness and the social optimality of the
Pareto optimal Nash Equilibrium by showing that it dominates all the other equilibria. Consider a
generic Nash equilibriumu associated to a compatible setC, sayλ its cardinality, different from
C. SinceC is maximal thenC ⊂ C. Then, eachi ∈ C, if exists, gets a payoff̂Ji(xi, ui, u−i) =




−i) = ψ(λ̄) + γ(xi, u
∗
i ); analogously, eachi ∈ C \C gets a payoff
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−i) = ψ(λ̄) + γ(xi, u
∗
i ); finally, each playeri ∈ Γ \ C,
gets a payoffĴi(xi, ui, u−i) = γ(xi, 0) = Ĵi(xi, u∗i , u
∗
−i). Then, in any generic Nash equilibrium
each player has a payoff not better than the one associated tou∗.
Observe that if and only ifψ(λ̄)+γ(xi, u∗i ) = γ(xi, 0) for all i, there exist two Pareto optimal
Nash equilibria with equal payoff. They are associated respectively to the maximal compatible
set C and to the empty set. Henceforth, we will callPareto optimal Nash equilibriumonly
the equilibriumu∗ associated to the maximal compatible setC. Also, observe that there is no
other Nash equilibrium with a higher number of active players than the Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium. Let us finally note that the minimizer of the sum of players’ costs, say itsocial
optimum, is in general not an equilibrium. However, if we restrict the minimization within the
set of Nash equilibria, then the social optimum is on the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium as
it has been shown in the above theorem. Restricting the minimization within the set of Nash
equilibria makes sense as the players participate to a noncooperative game, then any solution
that is not an equilibrium is of no interest.
V. CONSENSUSPROBLEM
With focus on the single stage game (9), we now introduce a protocol that makes the players
strategies converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium characterized in Theorem 3.
For all playersi ∈ Γ, let us refer tôai as their estimate ofa in the assumption that each player
may exchange information only with a subset of neighbor players. In this sense, the setΓ induces
an undirected connected graphG = (Γ, E) whose edgesetE includes all non oriented couples
(i, j) of players that exchange information with each other. Also, define the neighborhood of
player i the setNi = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {i}. Let zi(τ) ∈ R be a continuous time variable
describing the transmitted information forτ ≥ 0 and letT be a sufficiently large time interval.
The information flow is managed through adistributedprotocolΠ = {(fi, φi) : for all i ∈ Γ}
żi(τ) = fi(zj(τ) for all j ∈ Ni), 0 ≤ τ ≤ T, (13)
âi(τ) = φi(zi(τ)) (14)
u∗i = ũ(âi,ss, li) (15)
wherefi : Rn → R describes the dynamics of the transmitted information of thei node as a
function of the information both available at the node itself and transmitted by the other nodes,
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as in (13);φi : R → R estimates, based on current information, the aggregate info, as in (14).
The protocol receives as inputxi andzj for all j ∈ Ni and must be initialized at a pre-defined
valuezi(0). The value ofxi is used in (15) to computeli according to (11). The protocol uses
the estimatêai,ss to return as output the best responseu∗i as in (15), wherêai,ss represents the
steady state value assumed byâi(τ), namely
âi,ss = lim
τ→T−
âi(kT + τ), for all i ∈ Γ. (16)
In the rest of this section, we present a distributed protocolΠ = {(fi, φi) : for all i ∈ Γ}
proposed by the authors in [4], such that the steady state estimate coincides with the current
number of active players and with̄λ, i.e., âi,ss = a =
∑
i∈Γ δ(ui) = λ̄. Actually, the latter
condition is sufficient for the convergence to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of Theorem 3.
Assume that the transmitted informationzi(τ) is the current estimate of the percentage of
active players. For instance,zi(τ) = 0.2 means that theith player estimates only a twenty
percent of active players. Then, given the percentage of active playerszi(τ), the estimate of the
number of active players is simply
âi(τ) = φ(zi(τ)) = nzi(τ).
The protocol starts by assuming that all the players are active. This corresponds to initialize
the transmitted stateszi(0) = 1 or which is the same the estimatesâi(0) = n for all i ∈ Γ.
Then, each player averages its estimate on-line on the basis of neighbors’ estimates. If we
denote byz(τ) = {zi(τ)}i∈Γ, the averaging process can be described by
fi(z(τ)) = −Li•z(τ) − ∆(t − ti)
whereLi• is the ith row of the Laplacian matrix (see, e.g., [12], [16] for details), and∆(t− ti)
is an impulse signal due to whichzi(t
−
i ) switches to a lower valuezi(t
+
i ). Such a switch has
the meaning of a correction term acting at any timeti where the estimatêai(ti) crosses from
above the thresholdli and consequently theith player is no longer willing to be active. Impulses
may be activated only after the transient evolution ofżi(τ) has expired. We assume that this
occurs aftertf time units, wheretf is an estimate of the worst case possible settling time of
the protocol dynamics. A standard result in graph theory is that the settling time decreases as
the number of edges in the network increases. Actually, the speed of convergence depends on
the second smallest in magnitude eigenvalue of the Laplacian (known as Fiedler eigenvalue) in
October 22, 2007 DRAFT
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the sense that the higher (in magnitude) the Fiedler eigenvalue the faster the convergence [13].
In the light of the above consideration,ti is the first sampled timertf , with r = 0, 1, . . . where
function δ(ũ(âi(rtf ), li)) reaches zero, namely
ti = arg min
r∈N rtf (17)
s.t. δ(ũ(âi(rtf ), li)) = 0. (18)
Note that there may exist players characterized byli > n, for which ti = 0, and players
that never satisfy condition (18), for whichti = T . Observe that, as players are indexed by
increasing thresholds, it must also holdT ≥ t1 ≥ t2 ≥ . . . ≥ tn ≥ tn+1 = 0. Furthermore, note
that the evolution of the sampled valuesz(rtf ) for r = 0, 1, . . . is monotonically decreasing
which implies that the impulse may be activated only one time for each player (once you exit
the group you are no longer allowed to rejoin it).
Theorem 4:It holds âi,ss = a =
∑
i∈Γ δ(ui) = λ̄ for all i ∈ Γ.
Proof: With in mind the valuesti as in (17), let us setn+1 = 0, t0 = T and consider
the sequence of increasing discrete timestn+1, tn, . . . , tj+1, tj, . . . , t0. Also denote recursively
by M(tj) = {i ∈ A(tj) : li > |A(tj)|}, whereA(tj) = Γ \
⋃n+1
k=j+1 M(tk), andA(tn+1) = Γ.
Roughly speaking,A(tj) is the set of players that are willing to be active at timetj whereas
M(tj) is the set of players that are no longer willing to be active from timetj on. Then the
evolution of âi(τ) follows the discrete time dynamics
âi(tj−1) = âi(tj) − |M(tj)|, for all i ∈ Γ.
The above dynamics is monotonic decreasing and converges at the first timetj wh reA(tj) is
a compatible set. To see this, note that ifA(tj) is compatible thenM(tj) = ∅, and therefore
âi(T ) = . . . = âi(tj−1) = âi(tj), for all i ∈ Γ.
The above equation implies thattj−1 = tj−2 = . . . = T , which means that condition (18)
is never met for playerj − 1, if exists, and for all its predecessors, if any. In the extreme
case, we may haveA(tj) = . . . = A(t1) = ∅ which meanstj < T for all j ∈ Γ and also
that condition (18) is met for all playersj ∈ Γ. We have then proved that the above dynamics
converges whenA(tj) is compatible. It is left to show that the compatible setA( j) is the maximal
one, namely,A(tj) = C. We show this, by proving that ifA(tk) ⊇ C thenA(tk−1) ⊇ C for all
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k = j + 1, . . . , n + 1. By contradiction, ifA(tk−1) 6⊇ C, there must exist a playeri ∈ M(tk)
such thatli ≤ |C| ≤ |A(tk)| but the latter fact is not possible from the definition ofM(tk). We
conclude the proof by observing that
⋂n+1
k=j+1 M(tk) = ∅ and consequently
âi(tj) = n −
n+1∑
k=j+1
|M(tk)| = |Γ \
n+1⋃
k=j+1
M(tk)| = |A(tj)| = |C| = λ̄.
VI. A BEST RESPONSE PATH ALGORITHM
We have shown that the game (1)-(2) is a potential game as it always admits a potential
function (see Theorem 1). Potential games have the strong property that any best response path
converges to a Nash equilibrium. By best response path we intend a sequence of joint decisions
u(0) → u(1) → . . . whereu(j) = {u1(j) . . .un(j)} andui(j) is the vector of decisions (over
the horizon) of playeri at iterationj. Define a functionσ : N → Γ, which returns a player
for each iterationj of the sequence, i.e.,σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 5 . . . means that at iteration1,
only player 2 updates its decision, whereas at iteration2, only player 5 updates its decision.
By updating a decision we simply mean replacing the current decision by the best response. It
may happen that the current decision is already the best response and then the updated decision
coincides with the current decision. Now, each joint decisionu(j + 1) is obtained fromu(j)





i , . . . , u
N∗
i } is the solution of (8) for fixedu−i(j + 1) = u−i(j).
More precisely, at iterationj, let the current decision beu(j) = {u1(j), . . . ,un(j)} with
ui(j) = {u
0
i (j), . . . , u
N
i (j)} for i = 1, . . . , n. To solve (8) playeri = σ(j) needs to estimate the
number of active players over the horizon. This is possible by modifying the protocol presented
in the previous section. For fixedu(j), denote the vector of decisions at timek by uk(j) =
{uki (j)}i∈Γ, then the protocolΠ = {(fi, φi) : for all i ∈ Γ}, where
fki (z(τ)) = −Li•z
k(τ), zki (0) = δ(u
k
i (j)) (19)
âki (τ) = φ(z
k
i (τ)) = nz
k
i (τ). (20)
is such that̂aki,ss = a(u
k(j)). Remind thata(uk(j)) is the number of active players at stage
k given the decision vectoruk(j). Repeating the same argument fork = 0, . . . , N (we can
run the protocol in parallel) theith player can estimate the number of active players over the
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i (j)). In the light of the above comments, we show below the pseudo
code of an algorithm that, for a given functionσ(.), returns a best response path and consequently
converges to a Nash equilibrium. Letui(j) be the solution (decisions of playeri) at iterationj,
then
j = 0; WHILE not converging
{i = σ(j), compute a0(j) from (19)-(20) using current u(j)
update ui(j + 1) = u∗i solution of (8) based on a
0(j),
j := j + 1}
The algorithm eventually converges to a Nash equilibrium which depends on the chosen func-
tion σ(.). However, the choice of any generic functionσ(.) do not compromise the convergence
of the algorithm. The number of iterations is at most2nN . Actually, the best response for player
i does not depend on the value ofu−i, but only on the number of active players. Also, the
algorithm can be stopped if no players have changed their decisions in the lastn iterations. In
the next section we use the above algorithm in a multi-inventory application.
VII. M ULTI -INVENTORY APPLICATION




i = N is the








Let c be the purchase cost per stock unit,h the penalty on holding,p the penalty on shortage,
and Kki the transportation cost charged to theith retailer that replenishes at stagek. Also, let









δ(uki ) + cu
k
i + p max(0,−x
k+1










Hereψ(ak(uk)) is monotone since the active retailers may share the same truck for their supplies
and so the more they are, the less each of them pays for the transportation.
Example 1:Consider three retailers and parametersK = 24, p = 8, h = 1, c = 2. Retailers
face a deterministic demand over the horizon of ten stages (see Table I). The initial state is
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w1 4 8 6 5 7 8 4 5 6 8
w2 0 0 1 7 8 0 6 2 1 4
w3 0 3 2 0 3 1 1 3 3 0
TABLE I
x0 = [0 0 0]. Let us run the algorithm of the previous section in order to obtain a best
response path. The retailers, at the first iteration, do not consider the possibility of sharing
the transportation cost. No communication occurs among the retailers and they replenish in a
fully uncoordinated fashion as displayed in Fig. 1, left column. The absence of coordination
is evident as retailer 1 replenishes on days0, 2, 5 and 8 (top-left), retailer 2 on day3 and 6
(middle-left), while retailer 3 on days1 and 7 (bottom-left). At a second iteration, the3rd
retailer (σ(2) = 3) estimates the number of active players over the horizon by running the
protocol (19)-(20) and finds its best response by solving (8). The same argument is repeated at
the successive iterations letting the retailers unilaterally improving their payoffs one after the
other. The algorithm converges in six iterations. The supply decisions at Nash equilibrium are
displayed in Fig. 1, right column. Here you can notice that retailers 1 and 3 replenish on day 1,
retailers 1, 2 and 3 replenish on day3 and7, and retailer 1 and 2 on day5.
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